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Abstract
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to deception where deception is
dened to be the process by which actions are chosen to induce erroneous inferences so
as to take advantage of them. Specically, we introduce a framework with boundedly
rational players in which agents make inferences based on a coarse information about
othersbehaviors: Agents are assumed to know only the average reaction function of
other agents over groups of situations. Equilibrium requires that the coarse information
available to agents is correct, and that inferences and optimizations are made based on
the simplest theories compatible with the available information. We illustrate the phe-
nomenon of deception and how reputation concerns may arise even in zero-sum games
in which there is no value to commitment. We further illustrate how the possibility of
deception a¤ects standard economic insights through a number of stylized applications
including a monitoring game and two simple bargaining games. The approach can be
viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social
psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Error.
1 Introduction
Deception is a key aspect of many strategic interactions including bargaining, poker games
or business interactions.1 For example, as recounted by Lewis (1990), an investment banker
at Salomon Brothers in the late 80s had denitely to be an expert in deception in order to
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1The man of the street is also likely to identify deception as one of the most important keywords to
describe the phenomenon of strategic behavior.
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be successful. (Some aspects of the professional lives of investment bankers look more like
a poker game than the popular view of nancial engineering would suggest!) This paper
provides an equilibrium approach to deception, where deception is dened to be the process
by which actions are chosen to induce erroneous inferences so as to take advantage of them.2
To give a somewhat literary, yet popular, illustration of deception, consider Grimms
fairy tale The wolf and the seven young kids.3 Before going to the woods, an old goat told
her seven kids: Be on your guard for the wolf... The villain often disguises himself, but you
will recognize him at once by his rough voice and his black feet.Soon after the goat left,
someone knocked at the door and called out Open the door... I am your mother...But,
the little kids understood from the rough voice it was the wolf, and they cried out: We will
not open. You are not our mother. She has a soft voice. You are the wolf.After nding
a way to make his voice soft,4 the wolf went to the door for a second time and tried again.
This time he was denied access because he failed to show white feet, as requested by the
kids. The third time is the one of interest to us, the one where the wolf made his voice soft
and his feet white.5 As in the rst and second times, he went to the door and said (with a
soft voice): Open the door... I am your mother...The little kids cried out: First show us
your paw so we may know you are our mother.So he put his paw inside the window, and
when they saw it was white, they believed that everything he had said was true, and they
opened the door.
The next step is, of course, dramatic for the kids, but for those emotional readers, be
reassured that the tale goes on with an happy end. The crucial feature in Grimmstale is
the erroneous inference the kids make after seeing the white paw (and hearing the soft voice)
of the wolf. At that point, the kids believe it is her mother and they open the door: they
have been deceived by the wolf.
In Grimmstale, the kids are denitely right that when the one knocking at the door
has a soft voice and a white paw it is, in general, unlikely to be the wolf. (This is what
the goat taught the kids.) But, in the special situation in which the wolf is being informed
of the cues being used (as is the case for the third attempt of the wolf), the cues are not
informative any longer (because even the wolf can pass the test). Yet, when the wolf knocks
at the kidsdoor for the third time, the kids do not adapt their inference process using the
2Our view of deception is related but not identical to that of Vrij (2001) who denes deception as a
successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief that the
communicator considers to be untrue in order to increase the communicators payo¤ at the expense of the
other side (see also Gneezy (2004)). Vrijs denition puts an emphasis on the lie aspect of deception whereas
we put emphasis on the cognitive process through which the communicator manages to convey a false belief
to the other side.
3It seems that Grimms tales are better known in Europe than in the US. The following lines summarize
the key features of the tale that are needed for our purpose. A reader interested in the tale should consult
the full text (see, for example, http://www.n.vcu.edu/grimm/wolf_e.html).
4According to Grimmstale, eating a piece of chalk does that!
5He has had some our sprinlked on his feet.
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extra information that the wolf has been told the cues. This erroneous inference process is
what allows the wolf to deceive the kids in Grimmstale. More generally, this paper will
illustrate how deception may arise whenever agents use insu¢ ciently ne cues to make their
inferences.6
The cognitive bias this paper is related to has a long tradition in social psychology: it
is referred to as the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) (see Jones and Davis (1965),
Ross (1977), Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz (1977)).7 Roughly speaking, the FAE is "the
tendency (in forming one owns judgement about others) to underestimate the importance
of the (specic) situation in which the observed behavior is occurring" (OSullivan (2003)).8
In Grimms tale, the FAE takes the form that the kids simply ignore in forming their
judgement (about who is knocking at the door) that they have informed the wolf of the
required tests. This paper formalizes the FAE into a game theoretic equilibrium approach,
and it shows how deception can arise as a result of the FAE. In a nutshell, deception will
be viewed as the exploitation (by rational agents) of the FAE. The paper will also illustrate
how a number of economic insights are a¤ected by the possibility of deception.
To give an illustration of our approach, consider the popular belief that someone looking
into another persons eyes is unlikely be a liar.9 We will not dispute that it may be a
correct view in general. But, in some instances a manipulative individual (or a liar) may
take advantage of situations in which only this cue is used (to detect lies): By looking into
another persons eyes the manipulative individual can deceive the person he is interacting
with, thereby obtaining a favorable outcome.
To be specic, consider an environment consisting of two types of interactions referred
to as S (for strategic) and NS (for non-strategic) in proportions  and 1   , respectively.
All interactions involve agents 1 and 2, and all agents know which interaction they are in.
In both S and NS interactions, agent 1 must decide whether or not to look into agent 2s
eyes. There are two types of agent 1s: the manipulative ones in proportion 1   0 and
the non-manipulative ones in proportion 0. Manipulative agents incur a slight cost from
6Laibson (2001) analyzes the e¤ects of cues on the theory of consumption. Our paper highlights a di¤erent
e¤ect of cues, i.e. how the inference process is a¤ected by the use of insu¢ ciently ne cues.
7For further discussion and references, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_attribution_error
8Ross et al. (1977) report a striking example in support of the FAE. "Questioners" were requested to
ask di¢ cult questions to answerers. Every questioner was matched to a single answerer. After the quizz
(answerers and questioners then knew how many good answers were made in their match), it was observed
that answerers consistently thought they were less good than questioners, thereby ignoring that the pool of
questions on which they had a relatively poor performance was not generated at random but drawn from
the esoteric knowledge of the questioner. (The same study suggests that there was no observed bias on the
questioners side.)
9There is a long tradition starting with Darwin that tries to elicit the link between emotions and facial
expressions (with a special focus on whether subjects can control their own facial expressions). Ekman (2003)
who extends the study to deception and lie detection suggests that a number of facial expressions can be
controlled. He also suggests that subjects do not, in general, consider the cues that are the best predictors
of lies.
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looking into another persons eyes while non-manipulative agents slightly enjoy it. In NS
interactions agent 2 has no decision to make. That is, NS interactions are decision problems
(they are non-strategic), and given the preferences specied above, only non-manipulative
agent 1s look into agent 2s eyes in NS interactions. In S interactions agent 2 makes a
further decision that depends on her belief about how manipulative agent 1 (the one she
is facing) is. Agent 2s action is favorable to agent 1 when agent 2 thinks she is facing a
non-manipulative agent 1 with a probability no smaller than  where we assume that  > 0.
(As in Grimmstale, agent 2s need to be reassured about the type of agent 1 before making
an action favorable to agent 1.)
We now illustrate the phenomenon of deception. Suppose that agent 2s make their
inferences about the type of the agent 1 they are facing solely according to whether agent 1
looks into their eyes. That is, agent 2s do not disentangle between S and NS interactions
(in forming their judgment about agent 1sbehaviors), and looking into anothers eyes is the
only cue used by agent 2s to detect whether agent 1 is manipulative or not.
For  not too large, an equilibrium is that all agent 1s (whether manipulative or not)
look into agent 2s eyes in S interactions. The key thing to note is that looking into agent
2s eyes is benecial even for manipulative agent 1s (when  is not too large) because the
(small) cost associated with looking into another persons eyes is more than compensated
by the favorable action of agent 2 (that results from her erroneously positive belief about
the type of agent 1). More explicitly, after observing agent 1 looking into her eyes, agent
2 believes that agent 1 is non-manipulative with probability 0
0+(1 0) > 0: While non-
manipulative agents always look into another persons eyes, manipulative agents 1 do this
only with probability  (in S interactions); Bayesian updating delivers the formula. When
 is not too large, the posterior belief 0
0+(1 0) is above the threshold , and looking into
agent 2s eyes is worthwhile for agent 1 even when manipulative, because it leads agent 2 to
make a favorable action.
Agent 2 is being deceived here because looking into another persons eyes is not inform-
ative in S interactions (all agents 1 do this).10 So standard rationality would imply that
the posterior belief of agent 2 after observing agent 1 looks into her eyes should coincide
with the prior 0, and accordingly agent 2 should not make an action favorable to agent 1
(since 0 < ). Yet, agent 2 does make an action favorable to agent 1 because she (erro-
neously) feels reassured about the type of agent 1 after she observes him looking into her
eyes. Deception is a consequence of the coarseness of the cue used by agent 2.11
10Besides, agent 2 is well aware that she is in S interaction since in NS interactions she has no decision
to make. Thus, the situation cannot be interpreted in terms of incomplete information as usually modelled
in game theory.
11In the standard approach, equilibrium would require semi-pooling: In interactions S, manipulative agents
1 would mix between looking and not looking into agent 2s eyes so that they are indi¤erent between the two
actions (for this to be true agents 2 would also have to mix). In equilibrium, agents 2 would make the right
inference about 1s type (based on their observation), and manipulative agents 1 would not take advantage
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This paper considers a general framework to analyze deception in multi-stage multi-
player interactions from an equilibrium perspective. For the sake of illustration and in order
to highlight the phenomenon of deception, we assume that types di¤er only in their cognitive
abilities to represent the strategy of their opponents (which cues are being used).12 So types
should be interpreted as cognitive types, and deception refers to the possibility that an agent
may mislead his opponent about how smart he is (i.e., about how ne his cues are).
Specically, we consider two-player multi-stage games with incomplete information in
which the type of each player is dened by his ability to represent (or learn) the strategy of
his opponent, or to put it di¤erently, which cues the player uses to summarize the strategy
of his opponent. Following Jehiel (2005), cue representation is modeled by assuming that
players partition the decision nodes of their opponents into various sets referred to as analogy
classes, and players form expectations only about the average behavior of the opponent over
their various analogy classes. We add to Jehiels setup the possibility that there may be
several types (which is essential for a theory of deception), and we further di¤erentiate types
according to whether or not the player can distinguish between the types of the opponent.
Thus, cognitive types may vary in two dimensions: A player may be more or less ne on the
partition of the decision nodes of his opponent (the analogy part), and a player may or may
not distinguish the behaviors of the various types of his opponent (we refer to the latter as
the sophistication part).
We propose an equilibrium concept called the Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium to describe the interaction of players with such limited cognitive abilities (see Section
3 for a formal presentation). In equilibrium, the analogy-based expectations correctly rep-
resent the average behavior in the various analogy classes, and, wherever they move, players
play best-responses to their analogy-based expectations and to their belief about the type of
their opponent. As the game proceeds, players update their beliefs about the type of their
opponent according to Bayesrule as derived from their analogy-based expectations.13
The solution concept admits a simple learning interpretation: In the learning phase,
players have a limited access to the database that records the behavior of all subjects.14
of the possibility of looking into agent 2s eyes. This is a consequence of the indi¤erence property. For
both reasons, we feel that the standard approach (applied here to signalling games) fails to capture essential
features of deception.
12A more general framework would allow the types to di¤er also in their underlying preferences and
information structures (as usually dened in game theory).
13Recently, Eyster and Rabin (2005) have proposed a concept for static games of incomplete information,
called cursed equilibrium, in which players do not fully take into account how other peoples actions depend
on these other peoples information. Eyster and Rabins cursed equilibrium has some connection with the
analogy-based expectation equilibrium (see Jehiel (2005), Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Jehiel and Koessler
(2005) for further discussion), but their approach does not allow for the type of deception discussed here as
it only considers static games with no room for updating to take place as the game proceeds.
14There are populations of players randomly matched to play the game in every period and each subject
gets feedback about the behavior of other subjects in a limited way where the limitation may be thought of
as resulting from imprecise word-of-mouth communication.
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The cognitive type of a player (as dened by his analogy partition and whether or not he
distinguishes between the behavior of each type of his opponent) characterizes his information
processing at the learning stage. For example, a player with a coarse analogy partition keeps
track only of the average behavior within each of his classes. A sophisticated player is able
to keep track of the average behavior for each type while a non-sophisticated player only
keeps track of the average behaviors across all types in each of his classes. The Analogy-
based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept assumes that the underlying learning process
with data processing as just described has converged, i.e. it assumes that what subjects can
learn (given their access to the database) has been learned properly.15
Deception may arise in such a setup whenever there are several possible cognitive types
of player i (including the rational type) and player j is a sophisticated coarse type, by which
we mean that player j di¤erentiates between the behaviors of each possible type of player
i (the sophisticated part), but she does not distinguish the behaviors at each possible node
separately (i.e. she uses a coarse analogy partition and she knows only the average behaviors
of player is types in each analogy class). Deception is the exploitation (by rational player is)
of the erroneous inference process of player j that arises due to her coarse analogy grouping
on the one hand and her di¤erentiation of the behaviors of the various types of player i on
the other.16 It should be noted that the inference process is erroneous here only to the extent
that the cues used by the player (his analogy classes) are not ne enough. Players are in all
other respects perfectly standard in that they have correct expectations conditional on the
cues they use, and they rely on Bayeslaw (as derived from their analogy-based expectations)
to update their beliefs.17
Our framework di¤ers from the earlier literature on multi-stage games with incomplete
information and more specically from the literature on reputation in a number of respects.
To mention one essential di¤erence: in the entire previous literature, an agent updating his
belief about the type of his opponent (after observing her action) is invariably a rational
agent with unlimited cognitive abilities; that is, an agent who has a perfect understanding
of the strategy employed by his opponent.18 Such agents cannot be deceived since their
understanding of the strategy of their opponent is perfectly correct. This constitutes a
15Further theoretical and experimental work (permitting the control of the access to the database) should
be pursued to assess when such learning processes converge.
16Exploitations of boundedly rational agents arise in very di¤erent contexts (not involving mistaken up-
dating) in Piccione and Rubinstein (2003), Gabaix and Laibson (2005) or Spiegler (2005).
17Deception would a fortiori arise in our setup if we were to explicitly introduce non-Bayesian elements
in the updating process (see Khaneman et al. (1982) or Thaler (1991) for an exposition of such biases). But
such non-Bayesian elements are not the key element of our theory. The key element is the coarseness of
the cues used by the players (which, as explained above, is related to a well founded psychological bias, the
FAE).
18This is so even in the so called crazy type approach (Kreps et al. (1982)) in which agents are either
mechanical (such types are sometimes called behavioral) and make no inference or completely rational.
Unlike the word crazy typesuggests the types in this approach are better viewed as being fully rational,
but yet standing for di¤erent underlying preferences.
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fundamental di¤erence between our approach and the traditional approach, which has also
important consequences for the understanding of reputation. In the traditional approach,
reputation is associated with the idea of commitment (this formalizes an intuition appearing
as early as in Schelling (1960)), and reputation is successful whenever you manage to convey
the belief that you will behave in a certain way.19 Making such commitments credible may
be valuable in a number of situations including the chain store game (Selten (1978)), the
nitely repeated prisoners dilemma (Kreps et al. (1982)) and other interactions. In our
approach, the phenomenon of reputation may arise even without commitment concerns.
This is best illustrated through zero-sum game applications. In such games, there is no
value to commitment because your opponent can always guarantee her value if she is rational
irrespective of your own strategy (this follows from the celebrated minmax theorem, see von
Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)). Thus, the standard approach would conclude that there is
no room for reputation building in zero-sum interactions.20 We will illustrate how reputation
concerns may arise even in zero-sum games in our setup with boundedly rational agents (see
Section 2). The view that deception and reputation concerns may arise even in zero-sum
games agrees with the casual observation of poker games for which it is generally believed
that the best gains come when you do have a strong hand, but you get others to believe that
you are blu¢ ng (an elaborate form of deception and reputation building).
Beyond providing a theoretical framework to cope with the phenomenon of deception,
the paper also suggests how various standard economic insights may be a¤ected by the pos-
sibility of deception. We rst show how the analysis of incentives is substantially altered in
a simple monitoring game, in which due to the coarseness of the employers cues, incentives
are designed as if the employer were facing an adverse selection problem whereas he is, in
fact, facing a moral hazard problem. We next consider two stylized models of bargaining
where we suggest that nice behavior at an early stage may be used to deceive the other party
about one owns willingness to make further concessions. We also suggest how deception may
make some poor alternatives look credible in situations in which they would traditionally be
considered as irrelevant.
Related literature:
The paper can be viewed as proposing a bridge between the literature on psychology,
especially that related to the Fundamental Attribution Error, and the game theory literat-
ure, especially that related to bounded rationality and reputation.21 There are many other
19But, in the traditional approach this does not mean that your opponent believes that you are of the
type you are mimicking with a higher probability. If all types always behave the same, the posterior belief
must coincide with the prior.
20To the best of our knowledge, the only paper considering zero-sum games in the crazy type approach is
Crawford (2003). We will discuss the link/di¤erence between our and his insights in Section 2.
21It shares also some similarities with idea of bounded awareness as developed in Bazerman (2005) (chapter
11). From this perspective, our theory assumes some form of bounded awareness at the learning stage (agents
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approaches that mix psychology and economics. The following lines give a very incomplete
(and somewhat arbitrary) account of some of these approaches.
Following the lead of Simon (1956) many researchers have emphasized the role of beha-
vioral heuristics in decision making (see Gigerenzer et al. (1989) or Gigerenzer and Selten
(2002)). The cognitive types in our approach can be viewed as standing for heuristics used
by the players to understand the reaction of their environment. But, note that our cognitive
types are better viewed as dening learning heuristics rather than behavioral heuristics. This
view on heuristics does not seem to have its counterpart in Gigerenzer et al.s work.
The psychology literature has discussed a number of biases other than the FAE. Many
of these biases relate to the laws of probabilities: they include the base rate and conjunction
fallacies, the law of small numbers, the gamblers fallacy, overcondence....22 Most of these
biases are better understood as arising in non-repeated interactions. By contrast, our theory
of deception assumes that the underlying interaction is repeated su¢ ciently many times so
that players have learned all their cognitive types allow them to. Our work should thus
be viewed as complementary to those works analyzing biases that arise in non-repeated
interactions.
2 Deception in a simple Zero-Sum Game
We illustrate the idea of deception through a simple zero-sum game. As explained in intro-
duction, this will allow us to suggest a new motive for reputation building that is not related
to the commitment idea. Two players, a Row player and a Column player, play twice, in
two consecutive periods, a zero-sum stage game, G. In game G the Row player chooses an
action U , D, or B, the Column player chooses an action L or R, and stage game payo¤s are
as represented in Figure 1. Players do not discount payo¤s between the two periods, and
their overall payo¤ is simply the sum of the payo¤s obtained in the two periods.
L R
U 5, -5 3, -3
D 0, 0 7, -7
B 11/2, -11/2 0, 0
Figure 1. The stage game G
pay attention only to a limited number of regularities) whereas Bazermans discussion of bounded awareness
is more about the understanding of the rules of the game. Bazermans book also discusses various self-serving
biases in decision making and attribute them to the fact that people are "imperfect information processors"
(chapter 1). This paper completely agrees with the latter view, and it illustrates how imperfections in the
information processing may lead to the possibility of deception.
22While Khaneman et al. (1982) identify a number of these biases, Thaler (1991) also shows their signic-
ance in experimental economics. A number of economists have also developed theories motivated by these
biases (see, for example, Mullainathan (2002) or Rabin (2002)).
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When players are rational, they play the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game in
every period. The Row player plays U with probability 7=9 and D with probability 2=9 and
the Column player plays L with probability 4=9 and R with probability 5=9. The overall
value of the two-period game is 70=9 for the Row player and  70=9 for the Column player.
In equilibrium players play in mixed strategies in order to avoid being predictable. But,
note that no player is ever deceived by his opponent: Whatever players do in the rst period
they are expected to play according to the same mixed strategy in the second period, and
players do behave according to that expected mixed strategy in period two. As a matter of
fact, in a zero-sum game like the one considered here a player can secure his value no matter
what the other player does. Thus, with the standard approach there is no point in deceiving
the opponent as this could only lower ones own payo¤.
We now consider a setup with boundedly rational players. In our setup, deception may
pay (even in the above zero-sum game) because the erroneous inference process of the op-
ponent may lead the latter to think that he can do better than using his minmax strategy
(thereby opening the door to the possibility of exploitation).
Specically, we consider two types of Row players, the Rational type and the Coarse
type assumed to be equally likely. The Rational Row player has a perfect understanding of
the strategy of the Column player, as in the standard case. The Coarse Row player knows
(or learns) only the average behavioral strategy of the Column player all over the two time
periods. That is, the Coarse Row player has only an expectation about the average behavior
of the Column player all over the game (i.e., he bundles the two time periods into one analogy
class).
There is one type for the Column player. The Column player is assumed to be Sophist-
icated in the sense that he distinguishes between the behaviors of the Rational Row player
and the Coarse Row player. But, he is assumed to be Coarse in the sense that for each type
of the Row player he knows (or learns) only the average behavior of this type over the two
time periods, i.e. the two time periods are bundled into one analogy class. In short, we say
that the Column player is a Sophisticated Coarse player.
In the next Section we dene formally a solution concept called the Analogy-based Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium that describes the equilibrium interaction in such a setup. In
a nutshell, equilibrium requires that players play best-responses to their analogy-based ex-
pectations (and belief systems), and that analogy-based expectations are correct whereas the
updating of the beliefs is assumed to follow Bayeslaw as derived from the analogy-based
expectations. We will now check that the following strategy prole is an Analogy-based
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
Rational Row Player : Play U in period 1. Play D in period 2 if U was played in period
1, and U otherwise.
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Coarse Row Player : Play U both in periods 1 and 2.
Column Player (Sophisticated Coarse): Play L in period 1. Play R in period 2 if the
Row player played U in period 1. Play L in period 2 if the Row player played D or B in
period 1.
According to this strategy prole, (U;L) is played in period 1, and (D;R) and (U;R)
are each played with equal probability in period 2 (depending on whether the Row player is
Rational or Coarse).
Thus, the Column Player plays L and R with an equal frequency on average over the two
time periods, and this is the expectation of the Coarse Row player. Given his expectation,
the Coarse Row player nds it optimal to play U whenever he has to move.23
Clearly, the Rational Row player plays a best-response to the Column playerstrategy
(he gets an overall payo¤ of 5 + 7 = 12 and would only get an overall payo¤ of 0 + 11=2 at
best if he were to play D in period 1, a payo¤ of 11=2+ 11=2 = 11 at best if he were to play
B in period 1, and he would obviously get a lower payo¤ by playing U or B in period 2).
How do we rationalize the behavior of the Sophisticated Coarse Column player ?
The Coarse Row player always plays U , and the Rational Row player plays U and D with
an equal frequency on average. These (average) behaviors of the two types of Row players
dene the analogy-based expectations of the Column player. Given these expectations, the
Column player updates her belief about the type of the Row player as follows: When action
D is being played in period 1, the Column player believes that she faces the Rational player
for sure;24 We also assume that this is her belief after action B is being played in period 1.25
When action U is being played in period 1, the Column player believes that she faces the
Coarse Row player with probability 1=2
1=2+1=21=2 =
2
3
. This is the posterior belief that derives
from Bayeslaw given the prior and the analogy-based expectations of the Column player.
Given the above expectation and belief system, it is a routine exercise to check that
the Column players behavior is optimal in periods 1 and 2. In period 2 after action D
or B has been played, the Column player believes that she faces the Rational Row player
with probability 1 and her expectation about this players behavior is that he plays U
and D with an equal probability. It is then optimal for the Column player to play L (as
1
2
( 5 + 0) > 1
2
( 3   7)). In period 2 after action U has been played, the Column player
believes that she faces the Coarse Row player with probability 2
3
(and this type is expected to
play U always) or the Rational player with probability 1
3
(and this type is expected to play U
andD each with probability 1
2
). So overall in period 2 after U has been played in period 1, the
23This is because 12 (5 + 3) > max[
1
2 (0 + 7),
1
2 (11=2 + 0)] .
24D is never played by the Coarse Row player.
25Action B is never played in equilibrium; so action B could come from either type. The chosen belief can
be rationalized by assuming that with some small probability the Rational Row player trembles and plays
B.
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Column player expects the Row player to play U with probability 2=3 1+1=3 1=2 = 5=6
and D with probability 1=6. The Column player chooses optimally to play R in this case
(since 5
6
( 3) + 1
6
( 7) > 5
6
( 5)). In period 1, the Column player believes it is equally likely
that the Row player is Coarse or Rational (this is the prior). Thus, overall in period 1 the
Column player expects the Row player to play U with probability 1=2 1+1=2 1=2 = 3=4
and D with probability 1=4. The Column player optimally chooses to play L in period 1
(since 3
4
( 3) + 1
4
( 7) < 3
4
( 5)).
To summarize, a Rational Row player gets an overall payo¤ of 12, a Coarse Row player
gets an overall payo¤of 8, and the expected payo¤of the Sophisticated Coarse Column player
is  10. Note that the Sophisticated Coarse Row player gets an expected payo¤ smaller than
her value ( 10 <  70=9), and both types of the Row player get more than their value.
A key feature of the example is deception. By playing U in the rst period, the Rational
Row player makes the Column player (erroneously) believe that he is more likely to be the
Coarse type than the Rational type (because U is more typicalof the Coarse type than
of the Rational type). Because the Column player is su¢ ciently condent that she is facing
the Coarse Row player and this player plays U always, the Column player nds it optimal to
play R in the second period. The Rational Row player can then safely exploit this erroneous
expectation and get a payo¤ of 7 in period 2 by playing D. Observe that deceiving the
Column player in period 1 has an immediate cost for the Row player (by playing B instead
of U , the Row player could get 11=2 instead of 5), but the immediate cost is more than
compensated by the reward he obtains in period 2 after exploiting the erroneous belief of
the Column player.
If the Column player were fully rational, she would play R in the rst period and her
updated belief after observing U in the rst period would coincide with the prior (action U
in the rst period is not informative of the Row players type). Accordingly, the Column
player if fully rational would play L in period 2 (this is the best-response to the expectation
that the Row player plays U when Rational and D when Coarse and the belief that the two
types are equally likely). Hence, the Rational Row player would only get 3 + 0 under such
a scenario and the enterprise of mimicking the Coarse Row player in the rst period would
turn out to be quite suboptimal. More generally, if the Column player were fully rational,
she could secure her value  70=9 whatever the strategy of the Row player, and in the present
scenario with Coarse and Rational Row players in equal proportion the equilibrium would
be such that all players get their value whatever their type.26
26Observe that if there were only one type for each player characterized by his analogy partition as in
Jehiel (2005), then it would be impossible to reproduce the behavioral strategies as described above: For the
Column player to play a di¤erent action in periods 1 and 2 she should either be indi¤erent between playing
L or R (which cannot be the case here since the Row player does not play U with probability 7=9 on average)
or treat separately the behavior of the Row in the two time periods, but then in period 1 she could not nd
it optimal to play L given that the Row player always plays U .
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Comment : Our zero-sum game example suggests a new perspective on the theory of
reputation. When the cognitive abilities of the players are imperfect, reputational concerns
may arise, even in games in which there is no value to commitment. Most of the literature on
reputation has not considered zero-sum games (because reputation was viewed as requiring
commitment value, see Fudenberg and Levine (1989) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), ch
9). A notable exception is Crawford (2003)27 who analyzes in the crazy type paradigm a
zero-sum game preceded by one round of cheap talk. When behavioral (or crazy) types are
su¢ ciently numerous, Crawford (2003) shows that rational types can exploit the presence of
behavioral types and get more than their values.28 We wish to emphasize that in Crawfords
model (as well as in the entire literature based on the crazy type approach) those agents who
make inferences are fully rational and as such cannot be deceived in equilibrium (they have
a perfect understanding of the strategy followed by the opponent). So if a non-behavioral
agent (that is, an agent whose behavior is determined endogenously) can get more than his
value in Crawfords model, he can never get less because all such types are perfectly rational
(contrast this with our nding about the Sophisticated Coarse Column player who is non-
mechanical - her behavior is endogenous - and yet gets less than her value). We believe that
our approach is the rst one to allow for endogenous fooling in equilibrium. More work is
required to understand reputational concerns in our setup when the underlying stage game
is repeated over many periods.
3 A general framework
The aim of this Section is to provide a general framework to analyze the interactions of
agents with limited cognitive abilities of the type described above. The construction follows
those of the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)), and the
Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)). A reader interested in applications
may jump into Section 4.
3.1 The class of games
We consider multi-stage games with complete information. We assume that actions are
observable, and we restrict attention to nite games with two players i = 1; 2 (and possibly
Nature). That is, there is a nite number of stages and, at every stage and for every player
(including Nature), the set of pure actions is nite. This class of nite multi-stage games is
referred to as  .
27Crawford (2003) builds on Hendricks and McAfee (2005).
28When there are not so many behavioral types, all players whether rational or behavioral get their value
in Crawfords model.
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The standard representation of an extensive form game in class   includes the game tree
, and the VNM preferences ui of every player i dened on lotteries over outcomes in the
game.
A node in the game tree  is denoted by n, and N is the set of all nodes, while Ni is the
set of nodes at which player i must move. For every node n 2 Ni, we let Ai(n) denote player
is action space at node n. A node n will also be identied with the history h of play that
leads to node n. The set of players who must move after history h is denoted by I(h), and
ha is the history starting with h and followed by a where a 2 
i2I(h)
Ai(h) is the action pro-
le played (by the players who must move) at node h. The set of all histories is denoted byH.
Cognitive types:
Cognitive types are dened as follows. Each player i forms an expectation about the
behavior of the other player by pooling together several nodes in which the other player
must move. Each such pool of nodes is referred to as a class of analogy. Players are also
di¤erentiated according to whether or not they distinguish between the behaviors of the
various types of their opponent.
Formally, a cognitive type i of player i is characterized by (Ani; i) where Ani stands for
player is analogy partition and i is a dummy variable that species whether or not type i
distinguishes between the behaviors of the various types j of player j. We let i = 1 when
type i distinguishes between types js behaviors and i = 0 otherwise.
Following Jehiel (2005), type i s analogy grouping Ani is dened as a partition of the
set Nj of player js nodes nodes into subsets i called analogy classes.29 When n and n0
are in the same analogy class i, it is required that Aj(n) = Aj(n0). That is, in two nodes n
and n0 that player i treats by analogy, the action space of player j should be the same, and
A(i) denotes the common action space in i. The set of types i is denoted by i and the
prole of type space is denoted by  = 1 2:
Strategic environment:
A strategic environment is described by (; ui; p) where p denotes the prior joint dis-
tribution on the type space  = 1  2: To simplify notation we will assume that the
types of the two players are independently distributed from each other, and we will refer to
pi = (pi)2i as the prior probability of player is type where pi denotes the prior probab-
ility of type i.
29A partition of a set X is a collection of subsets xk  X such that
S
k
xk = X and xk \xk0 = ; for k 6= k0.
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3.2 Solution Concept
Analogy-based expectations:
An analogy-based expectation for player i of type i is denoted by i. It species for
every analogy class i of type i of player i a probability measure over the action space
A(i) of player j. Types j of player j are distinguished according to whether i = 1 or
0. If i = 1, i is a function of j and i, and i(j; i) is type i-player is expectation
about the average behavior of player j with type j in class i. If i = 0, player i merges
the behaviors of all types j of player j, and iis a sole function of i: i(i) is player is
expectation about the average behavior of player j in class i (where the average is taken
over all possible types). We let i = (i)i2i denote the analogy-based expectation of
player i for the various possible types i 2 i.
Strategy:
A behavioral strategy (for an arbitrary type i) of player i is denoted by si. It is a
mapping that assigns to each node n 2 Ni at which player i must move a distribution over
player is action space at that node.30 We let i denote the behavioral strategy of type i,
and for every n 2 Ni we let i(n) 2 Ai(n) denote the distribution over Ai(n) according
to which player i of type i selects actions in Ai(n) when at node n. We let i(n)[ai] be the
corresponding probability that type i plays ai 2 Ai(n); and we let i = (i)i denote the
strategy of player i for the various possible types i;  will denote the strategy prole of the
two players.
Belief system:
When player i distinguishes the types of player j, i.e. i = 1, he holds a belief about the
type of his opponent and this belief may typically change from one node to another. Formally,
we let i denote the belief system of player i of type i = (Ani; i), where i(h)[j] is the
probability that player i of type i assigns to the event player j is of type jconditional
on the history h being realized.
When player i does not distinguish the types of player j, no belief system is required. To
save on notation, we assume that in this case player i s belief coincides with the prior pj
throughout the game. We call i the belief system of player i for the various possible types
i, and we let  be the prole of belief systems for the two players i = 1; 2.
Sequential rationality:
From his analogy-based expectation i, player i of type i infers the following repres-
entation of player js strategy: In all nodes n of the analogy class i player j is perceived to
30Mixed strategies and behavioral strategies are equivalent since we consider games of perfect recall.
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behave according to the average behavior in class i as given by i.
31 The induced strategy
depends on the type j of player j whenever i = 1 (but not when i = 0). At every node
where he must play, player i is assumed to play a best-response to this perceived strategy of
player j.
Formally, we dene the i-perceived strategy of player j, 
i
j , as
If i = 1 
i
j
(n) = i(j; i) for every n 2 i and j 2 j
If i = 0 
i
j
(n) = i(i) for every n 2 i and j 2 j
Given the strategy si of player i and given history h, we let si jh denote the continuation
strategy of player i induced by si from history h onwards. We also let uhi (si jh; sj jh) denote
the expected payo¤ obtained by player i when history h has been realized, and players i and
j behave according to si and sj, respectively.
Denition 1 (Criterion) Player is strategy i is a sequential best-response to (i; i) if and
only if for all i such that pi(i) > 0, for all strategies si and all nodes n 2 Ni,32X
j2j
i(n)[j]u
n
i (i jn; 
i
j
jn) 
X
j2j
i(n)[j]u
n
i (si jn; 
i
j
jn)
Consistency:
In equilibrium, two notions of consistency are required: the rst consistency requirement
relates the analogy-based expectations to the strategy prole; the second one relates the
belief systems to the analogy-based expectations.
We start with the consistency of the analogy-based expectations. Analogy-based ex-
pectations are required in equilibrium to coincide with the real average behaviors in every
considered class and for every possible type (if types are di¤erentiated) where the weight
given to the various elements of an analogy class must itself be consistent with the real
probabilities of visits of these various elements. We will later on suggest a learning inter-
pretation for this consistency requirement. Here is the formal denition of consistency where
P (i; j; n) denotes the probability that node n is reached when players i and j are of types
i and j respectively, and players play according to .33
31This is the simplest representation compatible with type is knowledge.
32Remember that node n is identied with the history h that leads to it.
33Denition 2 places no restrictions on player is expectations about those analogy classes that are not
reached according to . A stronger notion of consistency would require that the expectations in this case
correspond to limits of expectations that would be consistent with small perturbations of . (Such a notion
is in the spirit of sequential equilibria - see Kreps and Wilson (1982) - and is discussed in Jehiel (2005) in a
simpler context. We have chosen to present the weaker notion of consistency for expositional purposes.)
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Denition 2 Player is analogy based expectation i is consistent with the strategy prole
 if and only if:
 For any (i; j) 2  such that i = 1, and for all i 2 Ani,
i(j; i) =
P
(0i;n)2ii p0iP
(0i; j; n)  j(n)P
(0i;n)2ii p0iP
(0i; j; n)
whenever there exist 0i and n 2 i such that P (0i; j; n) > 0:
 For any i 2  such that i = 0, and for all i 2 Ani,
i(i) =
P
(0i;
0
j ;n)2i p0ip0jP
(0i; 
0
j; n)  0j(n)P
(0i;
0
j ;n)2i p0ip0jP
(0i; 
0
j; n)
whenever there exist 0i, 
0
j and n 2 i such that P (0i; 0j; n) > 0.
The consistency of the analogy-based expectations should be thought of as a result of a
learning process. Specically, assume that there are populations of players i and j who are
repeatedly and randomly matched to play the game. In the population of players i, there
is a proportion pi of players of type i. After the end of a session, the behaviors of all the
players and their types are revealed. All pieces of information are gathered in a general data
set, but players have di¤erent access to this data set depending on their types. A player i
with type i = (Ani; i) such that i = 0 has access to the average empirical distribution of
behavior in every analogy class i 2 Ani where the average is taken over all nodes n 2 i
and over the entire population of players j. A player with type i = (Ani; i) such that
i = 1 has access to the average empirical distribution of behavior in every i 2 Ani for each
subpopulation of types j of players j. At each round of the learning process, players choose
their strategy as a function of the feedback they received, which in turn generates new data
for the next round.
Now suppose that the true pattern of behavior adopted by the players is that described
by the strategy prole . A player i with type i = (Ani; i) such that i = 1 will collect
data about the average behavior of types j in every class i 2 Ani as soon as a player j with
type j reaches some node n 2 i with positive probability (according to ). In the long
run, every such statistic should converge (in Cesaros sense) and the limit point should be
an average of what player j with type j actually does at each of the nodes n where n 2 i,
that is, j(n). The weighting of j(n) should also coincide with the frequency with which
n is visited (according to ) relative to other elements in i, hence the above expression for
i(j; i). A similar argument applies when i = 0 for i(i).
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Comment: In the above learning story we have assumed that there was a common pool
of data. An alternative specication would be that types i of players i have access only
to those plays where player i was of type i. This would lead to an alternative notion of
consistency, but the spirit of the examples discussed in the paper would continue to hold
under this alternative specication.
The second consistency requirement relates playersbelief systems to their analogy-based
expectations. The analogy-based expectation i of player i with type i = (Ani; i), i = 1
allows him to distinguish between the behaviors of players j with di¤erent types. As the
game proceeds, player i updates his belief about the type of player j using Bayes rule
(whenever applicable) and assuming that type j behaves according to is perception (see

i
j
above).
Denition 3 Player is belief system i is consistent with the analogy based expectation i
if and only if for any (i; j) 2  such that i = 1
i(j)(;) = pj :
And for all histories h, ha
i(ha)[j] = i(h)[j] whenever h =2 Nj
i(j)(ha) =
i(h)[j]
i
j
(h)[aj]P
0j2j i(h)[
0
j]
i
0j
(h)[aj]
whenever h 2 Nj, there exists 0j s.t. 
i
0j
(h)[aj] > 0 and player j plays aj at h:
Comment: The consistency of the belief system i with the analogy-based expectation
i should be thought of as resulting from an introspective calculus of player i. Based on
his representation of the strategy of his opponent for the various possible types he makes
inferences (using Bayeslaw) as to the likelihood of the various possible types he is facing.
This should be contrasted with our learning interpretation of the consistency requirement
for the analogy-based expectations (see above Denition 2).34
Equilibrium:
At every node, players play best-responses to their analogy-based expectations (sequential
rationality) and both analogy-based expectations and belief systems are consistent.
Denition 4 A strategy prole  is an Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if and
34A frequentist interpretation of the consistency requirement is also possible, but the eductive interpreta-
tion is more in line with the modeling of an inference process.
17
only if there exist analogy-based expectations i and belief systems i such that for every
player i:
1. i is a sequential best-response to (i; i),
2. i is consistent with  and
3. i is consistent with i.
An Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is conceptually very di¤erent from a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with incomplete information. The types in our setup are not
characterized by their preferences and their information partitions, but by their cognitive
abilities to understand (or learn) the strategy of their opponents. This is a totally new
notion of types that cannot be interpreted with the standard approach.35 Furthermore, the
inference process of the players is not the standard one (even though it is as structured as
the standard one, once the analogy partitions are xed). In the next two sections, we apply
the approach to several economic problems. Before moving to these applications, we make
two preliminary observations.
Proposition 1 In nite environments, there always exists at least one Analogy-based Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium.
Proof: The proof follows standard methods, rst noting the existence of equilibria in
which each player i is constrained to play any action ai 2 Ai(n) at any node n 2 Ni with a
probability no less than ", and then by showing that the limit as " tends to 0 of such strategy
proles is an Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Q. E. D.
Proposition 2 Consider an Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of an environment
in which one of the types of player i is rational.36 Then this type of player i gets the highest
equilibrium expected payo¤ among all types of player i.
Proof: The rational type of player i can always mimic the behavior of any other type
i of player i, thereby ensuring that he can get at least the expected payo¤ obtained by any
other type. Q. E. D.
Comment: The result of Proposition 2 should be contrasted with results suggesting that
irrational types may perform better in equilibrium. Here it is a comparison of the equilibrium
35Even when each player i can be of only one cognitive type characterized by his analogy partition,
Jehiel (2005) notes that an Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium cannot be viewed as a standard Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of another game with modied information structure. A fortiori when there are several
possible cognitive types, an Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium cannot be interpreted as a standard
equilibrium of another game with a modied information structure.
36A rational type is characterized by an analogy partition that is nest. Whether he can or cannot
di¤erentiate the various types of his opponent (i = 1 or 0) is irrelevant when he has the nest analogy
partition.
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payo¤s obtained by di¤erent types within the same equilibrium. It is not a comparison of
equilibrium payo¤s of the rational types vs the irrational ones when one switches from an
environment with only rational types to an environment with only irrational types.
4 The monitoring game
We consider the following stylized monitoring game. At date t = 0, an employee decides
whether to Work (exert e¤ort) or Shirk. After observing the employees date t = 0 decision,
the employer decides at t = 1 whether to Delegate the decision making to the employee (give
him discretion) or Control him. At each of the next two dates t = 2; 3, the employee decides
whether to Shirk or Work.
Payo¤s are specied so that the employee does not like working unless he is controlled,
and the cost of control (for the employer) is less than the benet that results from the
employee working.
Specically, if the employee works at t = 0, he gets 0 and the employer gets 1. If the
employee shirks at t = 0, he gets 1 and the employer gets 0. Whenever the employer chooses
to control (C), shirking at t = 2; 3 is costly to the employee but not to the employer who gets
2 whatever the employees choices at t = 2; 3. The employees pay-o¤ is strictly decreasing
in the number of times he shirks at t = 2; 3: He gets 2 if he works twice; 1 if he works once
and shirks once; and 0 if he shirks twice.37
Whenever the employer chooses to delegate (D), her payo¤ is strictly increasing in the
number of times the employee works at t = 2; 3. If the employee shirks twice, the employer
gets 0, if he shirks once and works once, the employer gets 2 and if he works twice, the
employer gets 3. The pay-o¤ of the employee is strictly decreasing in the number of times
he works at t = 2; 3: He gets 1 if he never shirks; 2 if he shirks once; and 4 if he shirks twice.
The game is represented in gure 2.
The standard analysis of this monitoring game is as follows. The date t = 0 employees
decision to work (or shirk) is sunk. So he should optimally decide to Shirk. Then the
employer should decide to Control so as to make the employee Work (the employee would
not work otherwise). The employee gets 3 and the employer gets 2.
Consider now the following cognitive environment. There are two types of employees: the
Coarse employees and the Rational employees. Employers are assumed to be Sophisticated
Coarse. That is, employers make their inferences about the type of their employees based
solely on the overall frequency with which the various types of employees shirk. In view of the
psychology literature mentioned in introduction, employers are subject to the Fundamental
Attribution Error: they base their judgement (about the type of their employees) based on
37An interpretation of the control technology is that it is such that the employee always fullls his task.
If he shirks, he is punished and eventually does what he should do.
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the overall working attitude without paying attention to the situation (date t = 0 or 2; 3) in
which the work/shirk decision is made.
Formally, Coarse employees put in the same analogy class all the decision nodes in which
the employer has to make a decision, and Rational employees use two analogy classes, one
for each decision node of the employer. The employee is Coarse with probability 2=3 and
Rational with probability 1=3.
The Sophisticated Coarse employer uses a unique analogy class that contains all the
decision nodes of the employee, and she distinguishes between the behaviors of the two
di¤erent types of employees, i.e. 2 = 1.
We rst observe that the behaviors generated by the standard rationality framework are
no longer part of an equilibrium in this cognitive environment. If it were, then the belief
of the employer should be that the employee works with probability 2=3. But, with such a
belief, the employer would choose to Delegate and not to Control.38 As it turns out there is
a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in this environment:
Proposition 3 The game has a unique Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure
strategies. At t = 0, the employee shirks when Coarse and works when Rational. In the last
two periods, the employee, whatever his type and his behavior at t = 0, shirks if the employer
chooses to delegate (D) and works if the employer chooses to control (C) at t = 1. The
employer chooses to delegate (D) if he observes that the employee works in period 1 and to
control (C) if he observes that the employee shirks in period 1.
In equilibrium, whenever the employee is Rational, he works at date t = 0, the employer
chooses to delegate D at date t = 0, and the employee shirks at dates t = 2; 3. Whenever the
employee is Coarse, he shirks in the rst period, the employer chooses C and the employee
works in periods 2 and 3. A Rational employee gets 4, a Coarse employee gets 3 and the
expected payo¤ of the employer is 5=3. Compared to what happens when all agents are
rational, a Coarse employee gets the same payo¤ as in the rational paradigm (!), a Rational
employee obtains a higher payo¤ and the employer gets a lower expected payo¤.
How do we rationalize these behaviors? In particular, why does the employer choose to
delegate to the Rational employee given the cost attached to not controlling?
Of course, our premise is that the employer is not aware of the structure of the game
(including the objectives of the employee). She has only learned that a Coarse employee
works two thirds of the time, and a Rational employee one third of the time (these are the
frequencies that result from the proposed strategies). Accordingly, she perceives a Coarse
employee to be a (relatively) working employee and a Rational employee to be a (relatively)
shirking employee.
38He would choose D and not C because ( 23 )
2  3 + ( 13 )2  0 + 2( 13 )( 23 ) 2 > 2.
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When the employer chooses between D and C, she cares about the type of her employee
insofar as it is indicative of whether the employee is perceived to be working or shirking. A
key aspect of her decision is governed by her updated belief after she observes the employees
action at date t = 0. When she observes that the employee works at t = 0, she puts more
weight on the probability that the employee is the working type. The employer chooses to
delegate, i.e. D, because she is su¢ ciently condent that her employee will work next with a
high probability. Symmetrically, when the employee shirks at t = 0, the employer puts more
weight on the probability that the employee is a shirking type (while he is, with probability
1, a Coarse employee of the working type). She chooses to control.
Rationalizing the behavior of the employee at date t = 0 is now an easy exercise. A
Coarse employee puts the two decision nodes of the employer in the same analogy class.
Accordingly, he decides to shirk in period 1 because he fails to recognize that the employers
decision to Control depends on the date t = 0 decision to Work.39 A Rational employee
perceives that by working in the rst period, he will deceive the employer who will believe
that he is more likely to be of the working type. Even though working induces an immediate
loss of 1 at date t = 0, it is worth doing because it leads the employer to delegate next,
thereby yielding an extra prot of 2 at t = 2; 3 (2 is equal to the di¤erence between what he
gets if the employer chooses D and he shirks twice and what he gets if the employer chooses
C and he works twice).
Our monitoring example captures important features of the deception process. In equi-
librium, the Rational employee manages to convey a false belief about his type. The em-
ployer is deceived by the Rational employee who behaves in the rst period in a way that
the Coarse employer associates with the Coarse employee (he works). The employer sub-
sequently chooses to delegate the decision power, and she is eventually exploited in the sense
that she gets a lower payo¤ than what she would have gotten by controlling the employee.
What is striking here is that the Coarse employee (rightly considered to be a relatively
working type) does not even work at t = 0, he shirks. The Rational employee in order to
be confused with a Coarse employee follows at t = 0 the most frequent behavior of a Coarse
employee, even though in this specic situation a Coarse employee would not even behave
that way. We recognize here standard swindlersstratagems. The swindler tries initially to
build a condence relationship with his prey. To do so, in the rst interactions, he follows
an excessively honest behavior (even a standard honest agent would not behave that way).
The coarse prey infers from this behavior that the agent he is facing is honest. He drops his
guard and the swindler takes advantage of it in the following periods. The swindlers strategy
relies on the coarseness of his prey who wrongly interprets his initial extreme honesty.40 A
39Ironically, this perception is the right one in the standard rationality paradigm.
40This phenomenon is well exposed in many movies such as The House of Games (1987) by David
Mamet, The Sting (1973) by George Roy Hill, The Hustler (1961) by Robert Rossen or The Color of
Money(1986) by Martin Scorsese (in these two movies, honest is replace by bad pool player).
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rational prey would rightly interpret this excessively honest behavior of the swindler in the
initial periods, too good to be trueor too nice to be honest, and would not believe in
the honesty of the swindler. But, a boundedly rational prey as shown in this example can
be deceived.
Another view on this monitoring example is that because the employer is boundedly
rational she does not perceive the interaction with the employee as one with moral hazard.
Instead she thinks she is facing an adverse selection problem, and the employers concern is
about how to adapt the monitoring scheme (control or delegate) to the type of the employee
(hard worker or shirking). But, it should be noted here that the mis-specication of the
employers model derives from the coarseness on the cues used by her. It is not a mis-
specication assumed exogenously. More generally, the example illustrates that whenever
agents base their decisions and inference processes on a limited number of cues, they may
be induced to have wrong models and wrong causalities in mind.
5 Deception as a bargaining tactic
Deception is a widespread phenomenon in negotiations. We suggest two simple forms that
deception might take in bargaining interactions.
5.1 A concession game
The rst example is a concession game in which parties alternate in making concessions and
they may ask for the intervention of a mediator. Here, deception takes the form that an
early concession is meant to (falsely) reassure the other party about one owns willingness to
make further concessions later on. This is illustrated through the following stylized model.
Two risk-neutral agents negotiate over the division of a pie of size 400. The negotiation
is represented by a series of reciprocal concessions of xed size. A player, when it is his turn
to move, must choose between two options. He can either concede one fourth of the pie to
the other player or he can ask for the intervention of an external mediator. If he chooses to
concede and after his concession there is something left to be conceded, in the next period,
it is the other players turn to face the same choice. If a player asks for the intervention of
the mediator, what has not been conceded yet is split into two equal shares between the two
parties. The party who asked for the mediators intervention must pay a commission fee, c,
equal to 7% of the share of the pie that the mediator has to split. The game ends when the
pie is completely distributed among the two players either through reciprocal concessions,
in the fourth period, or after the intervention of the mediator. When a player asks for the
intervention of the mediator, we say that he opts out.
The corresponding game tree is represented in gure 2 where payo¤s have been re-
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normalized by subtracting 150 from player 1 s payo¤s and 200 from player 2s payo¤s.
It has a payo¤ structure similar to the centipede game (Rosenthal 1982). Accordingly, in the
standard approach, no one wants to be the last to make a concession (he would rather prefer
opting out instead). This in turn induces an unravelling e¤ect, and equilibrium entails that
there is no concession at all. As a result, the mediator gets a very large share of the pie (he
gets 7% of 400, i.e. 28).
Consider now the following cognitive environment. With probability 1
3
, player 1 is Coarse
and he understands only the frequency of concessions of player 1, i.e. An1 = ffn2; n4gg
where n2 and n4 are the decision nodes of player 2. With probability 23 , player 1 is Rational,
i.e. An1 = ffn2g; fn4gg. Player 2 is Sophisticated and Coarse; that is, he understands the
frequency of concessions of player 1 type by type but not node by node, i.e. An2 = ffn1; n3gg
where n1 and n3 are the decision nodes of player 1, and 2 = 1.
Proposition 4 The following strategy prole41 is an Analogy-based Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium: Player 2 concedes in n2 and opts out in n4. Player 1 when rational concedes in n1
and opts out in n3. Player 1 when coarse concedes in both n1 and n3.
The equilibrium outcome can be summarized as follows: With probability 2
3
the mediator
is called at n3; with probability 13 he is called at n4. The expected fee paid to the mediator
is equal to 28
3
.
The crucial part of the equilibrium is about understanding the reasoning of player 2 at
node n2 and of the coarse player 1 at n3.
The coarse player 1 believes that player 2 concedes with probability 3=4 on average.
Thus, he nds it optimal to concede whenever he has to move (at nodes n1 and n3).42
Player 2 concedes at node n2 based on the following reasoning. Rational Players 1 are
perceived to concede with probability 1=2 on average.43 Coarse Player 1s are perceived to
concede always. Thus, when player 2 sees player 1 conceding at his rst decision node, his
updated belief is that player 1 is coarse with probability (1=3)1
(1=3)1+(2=3)(1=2)
= 1
2
. Combining
with the perceptions of the behaviors of player 1s various types, player 2 believes at node
n2 that player 1 will concede with probability (12)(
1
2
) + (1
2
)(1) = 3
4
at node n3. Based on this
expectation, player 2 chooses to concede at n2 (since (34)43 =
129
4
> 29).
Several observations are in order. For concessions to take place with the above specied
payo¤s it is vital that player 1 can be of several types and that player 2 has an incorrect
41The strategy prole in which players opt out whatever their types whenever they have to move is also
an equilibrium. Together with the equilibrium shown below these are the only equilibria in pure strategies
(see Appendix).
42At the equilibrium, player 2 always concedes in n2 reached with probability 1 and opts out in n4 reached
with probability 13 (because rational player 1 opts out at n3 and the probability that player 1 is rational is
2=3).
43At node n1 he concedes, at node n3 he opts out and these two nodes are met with the same frequency.
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belief at node n2 about the type of player 1. If player 1 and 2 were each of one type, it
would be impossible to observe concessions in equilibrium however these types are specied.44
For alternative specications of the payo¤s though (keeping the centipede like structure),
concessions would be possible even if there were one cognitive type for each player (see Jehiel
2005).
Observe also that if player 2 did not distinguish between the types of player 1 (i.e.
2 = 0) at node n2 he would opt out rather than conceding.45 Thus, if we were to add a
small proportion of non-Sophisticated Coarse players 2, these players would opt out at node
n2 (whereas the behaviors of all other players would be una¤ected). In such a setup, the
non-sophisticated coarse player 2 would perform better than the sophisticated coarse player
2 (the former would get 29 while the latter would get only 43
3
), thus illustrating that more
sophistication may hurt in equilibrium.
5.2 A wage negotiation game
Our second bargaining example is a wage negotiation game between a professor and the
dean of a university. The professor can generate outside o¤ers but this is costly, and the
dean is not ready to pay a wage rise unless he feels there is a signicant probability that
the professor would leave otherwise. Payo¤s are specied so that in the standard rationality
framework the professors threat to leave would not be credible, and thus there would be
no wage increase. As we will see, the possibility of deception will ensure that a rational
professor may sometimes get his wage increase in such a scenario!
Specically, the game tree of the wage negotiation is described as follows. At t = 1, the
professor chooses between accepting the status quo (SQ) or developing contacts with another
university (D) in view of an alternative faculty position in another department. Establishing
these contacts costs him  > 0. If he develops contacts, the professor asks for a pay rise 
(> 0) to the dean. At t = 2, the dean decides either to refuse (R) or to accept (A) the pay
rise. If the dean accepts, the professor stays in the department and the negotiation process is
over. The professor ends up with a higher wage, and he stays in his original position. If the
dean refuses, at t = 3, the professor chooses again between accepting the status quo (SQ) -
staying in his department with his initial salary - or developing further contacts (D) with the
other university at cost , getting from it an o¤er. If the professor chooses the second option,
44It is easy to see that no equilibrium in pure strategy with concessions can be sustained whatever the
analogy partitions. Whatever his belief player 2 opts out at n4. Thus, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the
most optimistic belief that player 1 may have (it corresponds to the coarsest analogy grouping) is that player
2 concedes with probability 1=2 on average. With such a belief, player 1 chooses to opt out at n3. But, then
player 2s belief about 1 is that he concedes at best with probability 1=2. This in turn induces player 2 to
opt out at n2 (because 29 > 43=2). Hence, player 1 s belief is that player 2 opts out always, and he must
opt out at n1. It is left to the reader to check that there is no equilibrium in mixed strategy either.
45By denition of his type he would not make any updating about the type of his opponent. He would
believe that player 1 concedes on average with probability 2=3 and 29 > 863 .
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he goes back to the dean, exhibits his alternative o¤er and asks for a pay rise 0 (> 0).46
At t = 4, the dean decides whether he accepts (A) the pay rise 0 or refuses it (R). The
professor stays in the department if the dean accepts the pay rise or leaves the department
and goes to the other university if the dean refuses the pay rise.47 If the professor accepts
the o¤er of the other university, the original department incurs a cost  X and the professor
gets U   2.48
We normalize payo¤s so that in the original situation both the dean and the professor
have a pay-o¤ 0. We further assume that X < 0 and U < , and to x ideas, we let  = 3,
0 = 4,  = 1, X = 7
2
and U = 1
2
. In a perfect rationality world, X < 0 implies that at
t = 4, the dean prefers to let the professor go rather than accept the pay rise. Given that
there is no pay rise at t = 4, U <  implies that at t = 3 the professor does not nd it useful
to generate an outside o¤er of U for an extra cost . Anticipating that no further search
e¤ort will be made by the professor, the dean at t = 2, nds it optimal not to accept the
pay raise. Finally, at t = 1, the professor does not develop contacts because he anticipates
no pay rise will be accepted. The game is represented in Figure 3 where the rst and second
decision nodes of the professor (resp. dean) are labelled n1 and n3 (resp. n2 and n4).
In the standard rationality paradigm, even though the professor has the possibility to
go for another job, the outside option is perceived as non-credible, and there is no pay rise.
This is a stylized and simplied version of the so called outside option principle (see Binmore
et al. 1989).
Consider now the following cognitive environment. With probability 1=2, the dean is
Sophisticated Coarse, he puts in the same analogy class both decision nodes of the professor,
i.e. An = ffn1; n3gg, he distinguishes between the various types of the professor, i.e.  = 1.
With probability 1=2, the dean is Rational, An = ffn1g; fn2gg and  = 1.
With probability 1=2, the professor is Coarse, An = ffn2; n4gg, he puts in the same
analogy class both decision nodes of the dean and  = 0, he does not distinguish between the
various types of the dean. With probability 1=2, the professor is Rational, An = ffn2g; fn4gg
and  = 1.
The following proposition illustrates the possibility of search activity and pay rise in
equilibrium:
Proposition 5 The following strategy prole49 is an equilibrium: A Coarse professor es-
tablishes contacts with an alternative University whenever he has the opportunity to and a
46We have in mind that 0 >  so that the new pay rise compensates at least partially for the extra
search cost.
47In the latter event, the professor could stay in his original position, but we assume then that the induced
atmosphere is quite bad for the professor (colleagues are quite upset).
48U is equal to the value of the alternative o¤er minus the costs the professor incurs leaving his university.
49The Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium strategy prole (described earlier) is also an equilibrium. (See
the Appendix).
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Rational professor establishes contacts in n1 and accepts the status quo in n3. A Sophistic-
ated Coarse dean accepts the pay rise in n2 and refuses to give a pay rise in n4. A Rational
dean always refuses to give a pay rise.
In equilibrium, the professor always makes an e¤ort to get an alternative o¤er at t = 1.
With probability 1
2
, the dean accepts the pay rise; with probability 1
4
, the professor leaves
his department (thus taking the outside option) and, with probability 1
4
, he stays in his
department with his initial salary. We observe that the outside option of the professor which,
in the standard rationality paradigm, would be considered as non-credible (and would thus
have no e¤ect), does a¤ect the equilibrium play here.
The logic of the equilibrium is as follows. First, it is readily veried that the behaviors
of the rational professor and the rational dean are optimal. So let us focus on the Coarse
professor and the Sophisticated Coarse dean.
A Coarse professor perceives that the dean accepts the pay rise with a probability equal
to 2
5
(= 1=2
1+1=4
) on average. For such a high probability of acceptance, it is worthwhile
developing further contacts at t = 3 since 2
5
(0   2) + 3
5
(U   2) >  . It is also readily
veried that a Coarse professor nds it optimal to develop outside contacts at t = 1.
The Sophisticated Coarse dean perceives that a Coarse professor always chooses D and
a Rational professor chooses D with probability 2
3
on average50. At t = 2, he observes that
the professor chose D in n1. Given this behavior, the Sophisticated Coarse deans updated
belief at n2 is that the Professor is Coarse with probability
(1=2)
(1=2)+(1=2)(2=3)
= 3
5
. Combining
the perceived behaviors and beliefs, the Sophisticated Coarse dean expects the professor
to make further search e¤orts in n3 with probability (35)1 + (
2
5
)2
3
= 13
15
. According to this
expectation, the dean prefers to accept the pay rise in n2.51
It should be noted that the dean accepts the pay rise here because he puts a su¢ ciently
high probability on the professor being coarse due to this erroneous belief updating. If the
dean were to keep the prior belief that the professor is Coarse with probability 1
2
(which
would be the standard belief at node n2 if the dean were fully rational), he would choose not
to accept the pay rise at n2.52
For rational agents, the presence of boundedly rational agents has two main consequences.
First, at the start of the interaction, Rational professors mimic Coarse professors and exert
e¤orts towards the outside university. That way, they deceive Coarse deans, and make them
believe that they are facing a Coarse professor with a high probability. Coarse deans accept
50In the rst node, reached with probability 1, a Rational professor chooses D and in n3, reached with
probability 12 , a Rational professor chooses SQ. Therefore, a Sophisticated Coarse dean perceives that a
Rational Professor chooses D with a probability 1+01+1=2 =
2
3 in the analogy class gathering n1 and n3.
51This is because  3 > 1315 ( 72 ) + 215 (0).
52He would have perceived that his payo¤ obtained by not accepting the pay rise is  3512 (= (
1
2  1 + 12 
2
3 )(
 7
2 ) + (1  ( 12  1 + 12  23 ))(0)) and he would not have accepted the pay rise (since  3512 >  3).
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the pay rise at t = 2 because they are su¢ ciently afraid that the professor would otherwise
leave. Second, Rational deans fail to be identied as Rational deans by Coarse professors
at t = 3. Coarse professors do not perceive that there exist two types of deans. Thus, even
though a Rational dean behaves di¤erently from a Coarse dean at t = 2, a Coarse professor
keeps on believing, at t = 3, that the dean will concede with probability 2
5
at t = 4. In
this case, Rational deans would prefer being identied as what they are : Rational deans
who never accept pay rises. Coarse professors would then choose the status quo at t = 2
and the rational dean would get 0 rather than  7
4
(the expected payo¤ in the equilibrium
of Proposition 5). This illustrates that it may be costly for a rational agent not to be
distinguished from other types due the cognitive limitations of other players.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3
First, a Coarse employee puts the two nodes in which the employer has to make a decision
into the same analogy class. Therefore, he always shirks at t = 0.
Second, if the employer chooses C, there is a unique best-response for the employee
whatever his type and belief are: To work at t = 2; 3. Conversely, if the employer chooses D,
there is a unique best-response for the employee whatever his type and belief are: To shirk
at t = 2; 3.
Therefore, to nd an equilibrium, we only need to focus on the decision of a Rational
employee at t = 0 and the decision of the employer.
Choosing D after having observed that the employee shirking at t = 0 cannot be part of
an equilibrium strategy since the employees best response would be always to shirk.
Suppose now that the employer chooses C both if the employee works and if the employee
shirks at t = 0. The employee, whatever his type is, has a unique best response: To shirk at
t = 0 and to work at t = 2; 3. The employer perceives that an employee, whatever his type
is, works with a probability 2/3. C is not a best response to such a belief and choosing C in
both cases cannot be part of an equilibrium either.
The only remaining possibility for the employer is to choose C (resp: D) when he observes
that the employee shirks (resp: works) at t = 0. A Rational employee has a unique best
response to such a behavior, to work at t = 0.
Now, we need to establish that it exists a belief consistent with these behaviors such that
the employer behavior is a best response to this belief.
If players follow the described behaviors, a Coarse employee shirks once and works twice
and a Rational employee shirks twice and works once. The employer perceives that a Coarse
(resp: Rational) employee chooses to work with a probability 2/3 (resp: 1/3). After having
observed an employee working at t = 0, her revised belief is that he is Coarse with probability:
(2=3)(2=3)
(2=3)(2=3)+(1=3)(1=3)
= 4
5
and, if she observes that the employee shirks at t = 0, she believes
that he is Coarse with probability (1=3)(2=3)
(1=3)(2=3)+(2=3)(1=3)
= 1
2
.
Crossing beliefs and analogy-based expectations, we obtain the following. After having
observed that the employee shirked (resp: worked) at t = 0, the employer prefers choosing
C (resp: D).
Q.E.D.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 4
We prove that no other strategies than the one mentioned in Proposition 4 and the strategy
prole in which players opt out whenever they have the opportunity to can be part of an
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equilibrium in pure strategies.
First, note that it is a strictly dominant strategy for player 2 to opt out in n4, therefore,
at the equilibrium, player 2 always opts out in n4. By backward induction, we can infer
that, at the equilibrium, if player 1 is Rational, he always opts out in n3.
Suppose that player 2 opts out in n2. If player 1 is Rational, he plays the unique best
response, opt out in n1. Besides, since player 2 opts out in n2, he always opts out when he
is in the analogy class fn2; n4g. Then either player 1 always opts out in n1 or player 1, if
he is Sophisticated Coarse, perceives that player 2 always opts out when he is in fn2; n4g.
Opting out in n1 and n3 is his unique best-response to such a belief.53 If player 2 opts out
in n2, player 1best response, whatever his type is, is to opt out in n1 and in n3.
Now, suppose that player 2 concedes in n2. A Rational player 1 has a unique best
response, concede in n1. Suppose that a Sophisticated Coarse player 1 opts out in n1 or
concede in n1 and opts out in n3. Player 2 concedes in n2 and never has the opportunity
to play in n4. Therefore, whenever nodes n2 or n4 are reached, player 2 concedes. A
Sophisticated Coarse player 1 expects player 2 to concede with probability 1 in fn2; n4g . is
strategy is not a best-response to his expectation.
There only remains two pairs of strategies that can be part of an equilibrium:
- Players opt out whenever they have the opportunity to.
- Player 1 concedes in n1 whatever his type is. In n3, if he is Rational, he opts out and
if he is Sophisticated Coarse, he concedes. Player 2 concedes in n2 and opts out in n4.
The rst strategy prole is consistent with (1; 2) such that players, whatever their
types are, expect that their opponent always opt out.
The second strategy prole is consistent with (1; 2) such that : (i) Player 2 expects
a Rational player 1 to concede with a probability 1
2
in the analogy class fn1; n3g and a
Sophisticated Coarse player 1 to concede with probability 1 in this same analogy class. (ii)
A Rational player 1 expects player 2 to concede in n2 and to opt out in n4. (iii) A Coarse
player 1 expects player 2 to concede with a probability 3=4 in fn2; n4g.
Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 5
We rst exhibit two equilibria in pure strategies and leave to the reader to check that there
exists no other equilibrium.
The rst equilibrium. Suppose that the dean always refuses to give a pay rise to the
professor. Then whatever his type is, it is a best response for the professor to always accept
53We should also notice that there exists no belief about the average behavior of player 2 in fn2; n4g such
that opting out in n1 and conceding in n3 would be a best response to this belief for a Sophisticated Coarse
player 1.
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the status quo since  3
2
<  1 < 0: Whether the professor gathers in the same analogy class
n2 and n4 does not matter since the dean behaves the same way in these two nodes if they
are reached. Now, if the professor never develops contacts with another department, it is a
best response for the dean never to concede a pay rise since  3 < 0 and  4 <  7
2
. Again,
whether the dean gathers in the same analogy class n1 and n3 does not matter since the
professor behaves the same way in these two nodes when they are reached.
The second equilibrium. Suppose that a Coarse professor chooses D in n1 and n3, a
Rational professor chooses D in n1 and SQ in n3, a Sophisticated Coarse dean chooses C in
n2 and R in n4 and a Rational professor chooses R in n2 and n4. First, let us remark that
the strategies of the Rational professor and dean are best response to the strategy of the
other agents. Now, a Coarse professor perceives that the dean concedes with a probability
1=3 in the analogy class fn2; n4g and a best response to this belief is to choose D in n3 and
n1 since  1 <  1 1+ 134+ 23 12 and 0 <  1+ 133+ 23 [ 1+ 134+ 23 12 ]. Besides, a Sophisticated
Coarse dean chooses R in n4 since it is a dominant strategy. Now, a Sophisticated Coarse
dean expects a Coarse professor always to choose D in fn1; n3g and a Rational professor to
choose D with a probability 2
3
in fn1; n3g. When n2 is reached, a Sophisticated Coarse dean
believes that the professor is Coarse with a probability 11=2
11=2+2=31=2 =
3
5
. He expects the
professor to choose D in n3 with a probability 35  1 + 25  23 = 1315 and, since 1315   72 <  3,
the unique best response to his belief and expectation i to concede in n2.
Q.E.D.
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Fig.2. The monitoring game
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(22,0) (0,29) (36,0) (0,43)
(50,0)C C C C
n1 n2 n3 n4
O O O O
Fig.3. The Concession Game.
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(-3/2,-7/2)D R D R
n1 n2 n3 n4
SQ A SQ A
Fig.4. The Wage Negotiation Game
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